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In his “Critical Response,” William Curtis presents three main criticisms against my position elaborated in “In Defense of Nonliberal Nationalism.”​[1]​ First, he alleges that my conception of national membership is “voluntarist” and ultimately liberal. Second, he claims that my position on nonliberal democracy is “quintessentially liberal.” Third, he charges that my account of nonliberal nationalism would allow the oppression of minorities. The first charge is based on Curtis’s misreading of my article. The second charge is interesting and worthy of consideration in itself. Yet Curtis fails to advance a clear argument to support it. The third charge has been dealt with in my original article, but I shall restate it here to meet Curtis’s objection. Although I shall address all three, the focus will be on the second, as I believe that it poses the strongest challenge to my position. In responding to these charges, I shall provide necessary clarification and elaboration and thereby strengthen the critiques, as Curtis’s own arguments are often unclear or non-existent. 

I.	National Membership
Curtis alleges that my emphasis on “the self-identification of a culturally embedded agent as a member” as a critical criterion for national membership is “voluntarist,” demonstrating my “ultimate commitment to liberal values,” which “directly undermines [my] argument for nonliberalism” (p. 3). 
The concept of voluntarism is used in myriad ways by philosophers of various backgrounds. Given its centrality in his critique, Curtis ought to specify how he is using the term voluntarism and clarify its relation to liberalism. He does not, thereby entailing logical gaps at various junctures of his arguments, as we shall see. In order to identify his criticism precisely, I shall assume the task of clarifying the concept. Although “voluntarism” typically refers to a metaphysical position that takes “reason and intellect as subservient to the will,” in ethics, it centers on the claim that “it is [individual] will or desire that creates values.”​[2]​ In the context of national membership, then, I shall understand voluntarism as a position that takes an individual’s will/choice as the decisive factor in determining her national membership. How is voluntarism related to liberalism? I shall understand liberalism broadly as a perspective that recognizes an individual’s freedom to determine her life conditions without undue outside interference and therefore advocates a political structure that would protect equal freedom of all individuals. Voluntarism in the context of membership, then, is liberal in recognizing an individual’s freedom to determine her national membership. 
With this clarification, we are ready to assess Curtis’s critique. Is Curtis correct to attribute voluntarism to my position? The answer is in the negative. Self-identification in my position is an important element in determining one’s national membership, but it is not the sole or even the most decisive component. The other factor is cultural immersion, whether due to birth or choice, of those who self-identify as members, recognizable by most other members. I explicitly qualify agents whose self-identification is relevant as “culturally embedded” in the very same statement that I invoke self-identification. The importance of this factor should also be obvious [from] my emphasis on internal democracy among national insiders (Herr, pp. 317, 318). The two factors are jointly constitutive of national membership, and neither is prior to the other. This implies that those who are not sufficiently embedded culturally are not eligible for membership, however they may desire or aspire to be a member. In other words, individuals are not free to determine their national membership. My position on national membership, then, is clearly not voluntarist. If so, then Curtis’s accusation that I am “importing liberalism” in my conception of membership, as well as his invectives concerning it (“naïve,” “cheap”), turn out to be groundless (p. 8).

II.	Democracy as Necessarily Liberal?
Curtis claims that my advocacy of democratic nonliberal polycentric nationalism is “quintessentially liberal.” As I said at the outset, this claim deserves a more careful consideration, as many, if not most, liberals agree with it. Curtis, however, only makes assertions without an identifiable argument, as we shall see. I shall later on construct and respond to a relatively strong argument for this claim, but let me begin with Curtis’s own criticism.
Curtis claims that my account of democratic nonliberal nationalism is “quintessentially liberal” due to “The assumption of pluralism, the ongoing political deliberation aimed at ‘reasonable agreement,’ the voluntarism, the goal of equality” incorporated in it (p.6). This impressive list makes me wonder whether Curtis aims to appropriate every worthy human ideal as a liberal invention, leaving only human evils for nonliberal/traditional cultures. Does he have an argument, though, for such claims? How are pluralism, the ongoing political deliberation aimed at a reasonable agreement, and equality quintessentially liberal? How is my position voluntarist? Curtis does not say. There is no argument; only self-righteous, yet unjustified as well as unjustifiable, assertions. Let us, then, examine his assertions one by one. Curtis’s assertion that pluralism is quintessentially liberal is patently false.​[3]​ I have already argued that equality is not quintessentially liberal in my original article (Herr, p. 318-20). Hence, I shall only examine whether Curtis is justified in alleging that I have surreptitiously adopted voluntarism in my account of democracy. In the process of countering this allegation, it will become evident that advocating public collective deliberations aimed at a reasonable consensus is not quintessentially liberal.
What does it mean for a conception of democracy to be voluntarist and how is my position voluntarist? Curtis provides no clarification at all. Therefore, I am once again left with the task of constructing his argument by going back to the concept of voluntarism given at the outset. The form of democracy directly entailed by voluntarism, understood as involving the claim that “it is [individual] will or desire that creates values,” would be a political process that considers the interest of each individual equally by allowing individuals to engage in negotiations or bargaining to promote their rational individual ends, representing their will or desire. This voluntarist conception of democracy is “quintessentially liberal” in its advocacy of individual freedom to pursue self-interest, and its primary goal is to enable each individual to maximize her self-interest to the extent compatible with similar aims of other individuals. Is Curtis claiming that my conception of democracy is voluntarist in this sense when he accuses it of being “quintessentially liberal”? If so, he is clearly wrong, as the aim of my conception of democracy is to promote common national values, not individual self-interest. 
The voluntarist sense of democracy, however, is not the only liberal conception of democracy. It is merely one version of liberal democracy often referred to as “aggregative” democracy.​[4]​ There is another conception of liberal democracy, “deliberative” democracy, which has been far more influential in recent decades among liberal democrats. I have already acknowledged in my original article that my position may be easily mistaken for a version of liberal democracy, and I had deliberative democracy in mind. Curtis correctly recognizes this, and alleges that my conception “strongly resembles” deliberative democracy.​[5]​ What he does not seem to realize, however, is that deliberative democracy does not necessarily follow from voluntarism. In deliberative democracy, participants in collective deliberations are required to provide justifications or “reasons” for their preferences, while in voluntarist or aggregative democracy it is sufficient that participants express their first order desires and preferences. Deliberative democracy is not necessarily voluntarist in that its aim is not the equal consideration of individual will, desires, and interests. 
My position on democracy indeed shares certain characteristics with deliberative democracy, the emphasis on public deliberations of political reasons being one of the most significant. Hence, the critique that my conception of democracy is “quintessentially liberal” would be strengthened if revised as follows: Any plausible conception of democracy that involves collective public deliberations aimed at a reasonable consensus is necessarily liberal. Therefore, according to this critique, my conception of democracy must be a species of liberal deliberative democracy. I believe that this is indeed an important charge that I must overcome to clarify my position. Although a proper response to this challenge would require an in-depth analysis that exceeds the bounds of this article,​[6]​ I shall show, albeit briefly, why my conception of democracy is not liberal by focusing on Gutmann and Thompson’s influential formulation of deliberative democracy.  
According to Gutmann and Thompson, deliberative democracy refers to a politics that involves free and equal citizens and their representatives arriving at political decisions by giving one another reasons that are “mutually acceptable and generally accessible, with the aim of reaching conclusions that are binding in the present on all citizens but open to challenge in the future.” Although this process may sound neutral, Gutmann and Thompson emphasize that democratic principles must be not only procedural but also substantive. This means that it is not sufficient that political decisions are reached by following a legitimate deliberative procedure, but they also have to conform to certain substantive principles. Gutmann and Thompson identify basic liberty, basic opportunity, and fair opportunity as substantive liberal principles that regulate the deliberative process.​[7]​ What is the philosophical basis of these substantive liberal principles? They are predicated on nothing other than “The idea of free and equal personhood itself,” which takes persons as “autonomous agents,” entitled to as much freedom[, compatible with similarly extensive freedom of others, as possible in determining the basic structure of government that will affect the conditions of their lives.​[8]​]
Now we can identify, albeit briefly, what makes deliberative democracy liberal and how my conception is not. Deliberative democracy is liberal in two senses, among others: First, deliberative democracy presupposes the liberal conception of the person as autonomous individuals, deserving of the most extensive system of liberties compatible with a similar system of liberties of others. Second, deliberative democracy requires that acceptable political decisions conform to substantive liberal principles designed to ensure the most extensive system of liberties for all autonomous individuals. My conception of democracy is decidedly not liberal in both senses. First, legitimate participants in internal democracy are first and foremost culturally embedded and self-identified members of the nation, committed to some nationally specific hyper goods. I used the term “strong evaluator” to refer to such agents, and it is not necessarily equivalent to “autonomous agent.”  Second, public collective deliberation concerns various aspects of national values and the national system meant to actualize those values. As national values may not be liberal, substantive liberal principles endorsed by deliberative democrats may not be constitutive of the democratic process. 
If I have succeeded in showing that my conception of democracy is distinct from liberal democracy, whether aggregative or deliberative, then, despite Curtis’s accusation that I am “beg[ging] far too many questions,” it is actually Curtis himself who is begging the fundamental question of democracy, presuming that democracy is necessarily liberal.

III.	Nonliberal Nationalism as Necessarily Oppressive? 
Having established that my position on democracy is distinct from liberal democracy and that nonliberal nationalism can be democratic in this sense, I shall now address Curtis’s third allegation that my account of nonliberal nationalism “sounds like a recipe for [] political oppression.” I have dealt with this issue in my original article (Herr, pp. 319-21), but let me briefly restate my position for clarification: I acknowledge that some manifestations of nonliberal nationalism are oppressive. My aim, however, is to provide “a philosophically plausible construction of democratic and emancipatory non-liberal nationalism as an ideal type” (p. 305). If nonliberal nationalism is democratic in the sense elaborated and all culturally embedded and self-identified members are not only allowed but also protected to participate in nationalist discourses, then the threat of political oppression would be considerably diminished. 
Some liberals, however, may still argue that nonliberal nationalism is necessarily oppressive because they subscribe to another prevalent liberal presumption that nonliberal values, which nonliberal nationalism aims to promote and protect, are necessarily oppressive. I have already addressed this concern by arguing that “basic moral injunctions are already entailed by most nonliberal national values.” Curtis, in line with the presumption, disputes it by pointing out that I do not cite any “empirical evidence” (p. 7). The reason I do not cite any empirical evidence is that it is too obvious to those who pay attention to philosophies or traditions advocating nonliberal values. Merely browsing through introductory volumes to any major non-Western, non-liberal philosophy, written by insider experts recognized by other members, would provide sufficient evidence to support my claim.​[9]​ Unfortunately, it seems to me that attempts to venture outside of the liberal tradition and pay attention to the viewpoints of those from other traditions are rarely made by liberals, which partly explains the persistence and pervasiveness of the liberal presumption.
Yet, as I have acknowledged and discussed in the original article, there remains the issue of a small minority who obviously lack cultural immersion in and/or emotional attachment to the national culture and are public in their disinterest in promoting the [national] common good (Herr, p. 320)—we might call them “intransigent non-members.”​[10]​ As Curtis points out, I do believe that “censorship” concerning such individuals is justifiable under certain well-defined circumstances.​[11]​ Two conditions for justifiable censorship are crucial. One, of course, is that it is democratically endorsed. Only the majority of national members has authority to decide when censorship can be legitimately imposed.​[12]​ Another condition is that efforts are made to minimize harm to those censored, which is consistent with a basic moral injunction to avoid unnecessary harm, entailed by most, if not all, non-liberal national values. 
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